The Limited Liability Effect in Experimental Duopoly Markets by Jörg Oechssler & Frank Schuhmacher
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers
Discussion Paper 36/2001
The Limited Liability Eﬀect in Experimental
Duopoly Markets
by
J¨ org Oechssler, Frank Schuhmacher
December 2001
Bonn Graduate School of Economics
Department of Economics
University of Bonn
Adenauerallee 24 - 42
D-53113 Bonn                                     The Bonn Graduate School of  Economics is








Brander and Lewis argue in a seminal paper (AER, 1986) that
a ￿rm￿s debt-equity ratio should have important strategic eﬀects on
product market competition. We test their model in a duopoly ex-
periment under both, Bertrand and Cournot competition. We ￿nd
that leverage has strategic eﬀects, but those eﬀects are much weaker
than predicted by theory. Speci￿cally, we ￿nd for price competition a
general tendency towards collusion, which has the same overall conse-
quences ￿ but deviates from ￿ the subgame perfect equilibrium predic-
tion. With quantity competition subjects choose much less debt than
predicted by theory. It appears that subjects recognize the strategic
eﬀects of their own debt. However, they do not (want to) acknowledge
possible strategic advantages of opponents￿ debt.
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In the last 10t o15 years a small, but growing literature has emerged that
explores the interaction between product market competition and ￿nancial
structure of ￿rms.1 In their pioneering work, Brander and Lewis (1986)
observe that debt can work as a credible signal for a more aggressive position
on the product market, which gives a ￿rm a competitive advantage in a
market characterized by quantity competition. Thus, ￿rms have an incentive
to choose the debt￿equity ratio in a strategic way.
The key insight is that managers acting in the interest of equityhold-
ers ignore pro￿ts in bankrupt states, in which debtholders become residuals
claimants of pro￿ts.2 Since the ￿rm is acting in an oligopolistic market, the
eﬀect of the ￿rm￿s ￿nancial policy on its own production behavior strate-
gically in￿uences the rival ￿rm￿s production behavior as well. Foresighted
owners anticipate these eﬀects and use the ￿nancial structure so as to in-
￿uence the output market equilibrium in their favor. Brander and Lewis
(1986) call this the limited liability eﬀect of debt ￿nancing. In this paper
we present the ￿rst experimental study of the limited liability eﬀect of debt
￿nancing in oligopoly.3
We are accustomed to see theoretical results for quantity competition
being exactly reversed when price competition is assumed instead. However,
as pointed out by Showalter (1995), the results of Brander and Lewis (1986)
are robust to this modi￿cation with the restriction that the uncertainty in
the model derives from uncertain demand conditions (rather than uncertain
cost conditions). With cost uncertainty, though, ￿rms would forego debt for
strategic reasons.
Thus, theory makes some very speci￿c predictions depending on the type
of product market competition (quantity versus price) and the type of uncer-
tainty (demand versus cost). In principle, there are four empirically testable
implications of the theory. (1)A￿rm￿s ￿nancial structure aﬀects its own
p r o d u c tm a r k e tb e h a v i o r .( 2 )A￿rm￿s ￿nancial structure aﬀects other ￿rms￿
product market behavior. (3) Those linkages depend in a particular way on
1For an overview, see Maksimovic (1995).
2See Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers (1977).
3Experiments that study structurally similar problems in diﬀerent contexts include
Anderhub et al. (2000), Huck et al. (2000), and Engelmann and Normann (2001).
1t h et y p eo fp r o d u c tm a r k e tc o m p e t i t i o na n do nt h et y p eo fu n c e r t a i n t y .
And (4), ￿rms choose the debt￿equity ratio strategically. In general, the
available empirical data will not allow to test all those hypothesis. For this
reason, the application of experimental methods yields a useful supplement
to empirical studies on the matter.
In the ￿rst empirical study of the limited liability eﬀect, Opler and Tit-
man (1994) investigate whether ￿rms with high leverage are more likely to
experience performance losses in industry downturns than other ￿rms. They
present evidence that leveraged ￿rms experience disproportionately large de-
clines in sales and equity value in periods of economic distress. Hence, the
￿nancial structure aﬀects the ￿rm￿s own product market behavior, but is it
not clear whether it in￿uences the rival ￿rms￿ product market behavior.
Chevalier (1995a,b) uses an ingenious data set in which leveraged buy-
outs (LBO) of supermarket chains work as a natural experiment of an in-
crease in debt. In one paper (1995a) she examines how a price index changes
when an incumbent supermarket chain in the city undertakes an LBO. She
￿nds evidence of price increases following the LBO if rival ￿rms are also
highly leveraged. However, price decreases are observed following an LBO
when rival ￿rms are not highly leveraged, or when a single large competitor
with low leverage controls a large share of the local market. If one assumes
that one supermarket chain has only a small in￿uence on the price index,
this study supports the hypothesis that a ￿rm￿s ￿nancial structure has an
eﬀect on the rivals￿ product market behavior.
In a second paper (1995b) Chevalier ￿nds that an LBO announcement
increases share prices of the LBO￿￿rm￿s rivals indicating that debt has a
mitigating eﬀect on product market competition. She also examines the
entry behavior of supermarket chains following an LBO and ￿nds that entry
seems to increase, which again points to softer product market competition.
Phillips (1995) considers whether a ￿rm￿s capital structure decision has
an eﬀect on output and product pricing decisions in four industries. The
results using individual ￿rms￿ sales and cost data indicate that in the ma-
jority of markets industry output is negatively associated with the average
industry debt ratio.
Kovenock and Phillips (1997) show that following a recapitalization,
￿rms in industries with high concentration are more likely to close plants
2and less likely to invest. Rival ￿rms are less likely to close plants and more
likely to invest when the market share of leveraged ￿r m si sh i g h e r . T a k e n
together, the evidence of the cited studies seems to support implications (1)
and (2). With respect to implication (3), most studies support the hypothe-
sis that debt softens product market competition which is contrary to what
the Brander and Lewis (1986) model implies.
However, none of the above studies was designed to shed light on the
question whether ￿rms actually choose debt for strategic reasons. Two re-
cent studies by Showalter (1999) and Wanzenried (2000) present indirect
evidence in favor of the latter hypothesis. Recall that Showalter￿s (1995)
model with price competition implies that debt has positive strategic ef-
fects only when there is demand uncertainty. While it not straightforward
how to empirically distinguish between demand and cost uncertainty in a
market, Showalter (1999) shows that manufacturing ￿rms increase debt as
demand uncertainty grows, but reduce debt as costs become more uncertain.
Wanzenried (2000) shows that higher demand uncertainty goes along with
higher leverage.
In this paper, we complement the empirical studies by analyzing strate-
gic behavior in an experimental laboratory. We consider three diﬀerent
scenarios (quantity competition, price competition with cost uncertainty,
and price competition with demand uncertainty) and investigate the eﬀects
limited liability has on ￿rm￿s own behavior, on rival ￿rm￿s behavior, and
whether ￿rms choose debt strategically.
Our experimental evidence can be summarized as follows. With quantity
competition, debt has a strategic eﬀect only on the own output. It seems
that subjects do not (want to) recognize possible strategic advantages of
opponents due to debt. In turn, this implies that subjects choose much less
debt than predicted by Brander and Lewis (1986). With price competition,
subjects in the majority choose high debt with demand uncertainty and low
debt with cost uncertainty as predicted by Showalter (1995). However, since
behavior in oﬀ￿equilibrium subgames is not in line with theory, we explain
this ￿nding by a general tendency towards collusion rather by subgame
perfect play. Possibly, the theory is supported for the wrong reason.
In the next section we introduce the experimental design with our six
treatments. In Section 3 we derive the theoretical solutions and several
3predictions, which can then be tested experimentally. The results of those
tests are presented in Section 4, followed by a Conclusion in Section 5.
The Appendix contains the translation of the instructions for one of our
treatments.
2 Experimental design
We study several repeated duopolies in a computerized4 experiment. Com-
mon to all markets is that debt ￿nancing is required to produce and sell a
good in a market. Due to uncertainty in the market conditions, ￿rms will
sometimes be unable to repay their debt in full, giving rise to a limited liabil-
ity problem. We study both, Cournot and Bertrand competition, which are
described in detail in the next two subsections. In line with the theory, for
Bertrand competition we distinguish between demand and cost uncertainty.
The timing is as follows. The experiment consists of 5 ￿years￿, y =
1,...,5. Each year consists of 12￿ m o n t h s ￿ ,m =1 ,...,12. At the beginning
of each year subjects are randomly matched with one other subject for the
duration of this year.5 They are informed about their total pro￿ti ne a c ho f
the previous years and of the debt level of their opponent for the current year.
In each month a ￿rm chooses its action (price pi or quantity qi, respectively)
w h i c hh o l d sf o re a c ho fi t s10 independent submarkets or ￿countries￿. Since
pro￿ts are stochastic, the 10 submarkets are introduced as a device to better
approximate expected pro￿ts by average pro￿ts in each month.
Financing is required for each of the 10 submarkets. The debt contract
of each ￿rm is ￿xed for a given year and all submarkets and is characterized
by a pair (bi,d i), where bi ∈ {b,B} denotes the amount borrowed by ￿rm i
f o re a c ho fi t sp r o j e c t s , and di ∈ {d,D} denotes the debt obligation ￿rm i
promises to pay to the creditors for this project at the end of the month out
of operating pro￿ts πi.I fa￿rm is unable to meet its debt obligation for a
given submarket, creditors are paid whatever operating pro￿ts are available.
That is, a creditor for a given project receives min{di,πi}.
In years 1 through 4 debt contracts are ￿xed exogenously by the exper-
imenters. In year 5 subjects are allowed to choose between two contracts
4We used the software toolbox ￿RatImage￿ developed by Abbink and Sadrieh (1995).
5The matching was randomly determined ahead of time in matching groups of 6 sub-
jects with the restriction that no subjects played with another subject twice.
4Table 1: Treatments
action type of uncertainty ordering
up down
price cost C￿up (2) C￿down (2)
price demand D￿up (2) D￿down (2)
quantity Q￿up (4) Q￿down (4)
Note: The number of independent groups (each consisting of 6 subjects) is denoted
in parenthesis.
(b,d) and (B,D). One treatment variable in our experiment is the ordering
of exogenously chosen debt levels. In treatments ￿up￿ both ￿rms start with
low debt levels in the ￿rst year. In the second year one ￿rm has a high debt
level and the other ￿rm a low debt level (Dd).I nt h et h i r dy e a rd e b tl e v e l s
are reversed (dD), and in the fourth year both ￿rms have high debt levels
(DD). In treatments ￿down￿ this order is exactly reversed.
up dd → Dd → dD → DD
down DD → dD → Dd → dd
This 3 ￿ 2 design is summarized in Table 1.
The pro￿t from each project is uncertain, where the uncertainty can
derive either from uncertain demand conditions or uncertain cost conditions
(for the linear Cournot model there is no diﬀerence between the two). The
uncertainty is resolved independently for each submarket at the end of each
month after actions have been chosen. Low debt levels, d,a r es u c ht h a t
￿rms can always meet their debt obligations. Hence, there is no default risk
and, abstracting from discounting, debt value equals debt obligation, b = d.
With high debt levels, D, ￿rms can meet their debt obligations if and only
if the state of nature is favorable, i.e. high demand or low cost, respectively.
Due to limited liability, creditors will demand that D>B . To be plausible
we chose the parameters such that a zero￿(expected) pro￿t condition holds
for creditors as explained in Section 3. Table 2 lists the parameters used in
the experiment.
The 96 subjects for this experiment were recruited via posters at the
University of Bonn. Only about half of the subjects were economics stu-
dents. In each session 12 subjects participated. Subjects were randomly
5Table 2: Parameters
action type of uncertainty BD d = b
price cost 43 62 1
price demand 50 62 1
quantity 284 400 40
allocated to computer terminals in the lab such that they could not infer
with whom they would interact. For each of our four Bertrand treatments
we had 2 matching groups of 6 subjects each. To have the same number of
observations for quantity competition, we used 4 matching groups for each
of our two Cournot treatments.
Subjects were paid according to their total pro￿ts. Pro￿ts were denom-
inated in ￿Taler￿. The exchange rates for German Marks in the Bertrand
treatments was 2000T =1 DM and 10000T =1 DM in the Cournot treat-
ments. The average payoﬀ was DM 23.08 across all treatments.
Sessions lasted about 60 minutes including instruction time. Instructions
(see Appendix) were written on paper and distributed in the beginning of
each session. After the instructions were read, we asked subjects to answer
two test questions. Once all subjects answered the test questions correctly,
we started the ￿rst round.
2.1 Price competition
The cost function for each project is C(qi)=ciqi. Demand for each project
depends negatively on ￿rm i￿s price and positively on its competitor￿s price
pj and is given by the following linear demand function for diﬀerentiated
goods
qi =m a x {a − 1.2pi + pj,0}. (1)
Thus, operating pro￿ts for each project are
πi =( pi − ci)qi. (2)
For price competition we diﬀerentiate between demand and cost uncertainty.
With demand uncertainty the random variable a can assume the values 5 or
6Table 3: operating pro￿ts, Bertrand model, cost uncertainty
your the other￿s price
price 7 8 9 10
7 101 58.5 16 111 61.5 12 123 65 7 132 67.5 3
8 99 64 29 110 68.5 27 125 74.5 24 135 78.5 22
9 90 65.5 41 103 72 41 121 81 41 134 88 42
10 79 62 45 94 70.5 47 114 81.5 49 128 89.5 51
Note: First entry in each block: pro￿t per submarket in low cost state, second
entry:a v e r a g ep r o ￿t, third entry: pro￿ti nh i g hc o s ts t a t e .
Table 4: operating pro￿ts, Bertrand model, demand uncertainty
your the other￿s price
price 9 10 11 12
9 103 68.5 34 110 76 42 120 85.5 51 127 93 59
10 107 67.5 28 115 75.5 36 127 87 47 135 95.5 56
11 108 61 14 118 71 24 131 84.5 38 141 94 47
12 105 53 1 116 64 12 132 79.5 27 143 90.5 38
Note: First entry in each block: pro￿t per submarket in high demand state, second
entry:a v e r a g ep r o ￿t, third entry: pro￿t in low demand state.
15, each with probability 1/2 while ci =2 . With cost uncertainty ci can be
either 0 or 10 with probability 1/2, while a =1 0 .
To simplify the presentation all payoﬀ information was provided via
printed tables that were handed out to subjects. Only four diﬀerent prices
could be chosen. The prices correspond to the (unique) equilibrium prices of
t h ef o u rp o s s i b l es u b g a m e sdd, Dd, dD and DD.6 Tables 3 and 4 show the
operating pro￿ts with cost and demand uncertainty, where the ￿rst entry
in each cell corresponds to the favorable state of nature while the last entry
corresponds to the unfavorable one. The second entry in italics show the
expected operating pro￿t( t h es e c o n de n t r yw a snot shown to subjects).
The payoﬀs in Tables 3 and 4 were derived from (2) by rounding all prof-
its to the next integer.7 Furthermore a constant (12 for demand uncertainty,
40 for cost uncertainty) was added to all payoﬀs to avoid negative payoﬀs
which would have resulted in a limited liability eﬀe c te v e nf o rl o wd e b tl e v e l s .
6See the next section for the calculation of those equilibria.
7In two cases we rounded to the ￿wrong￿ integer in order to preserve payoﬀ diﬀerences.
7Table 5: operating pro￿ts, Cournot model
your the other￿s quantity
quan. 9 13 16 19
9 310 400 490 274 364 454 247 337 427 220 310 400
13 306 436 566 254 384 514 215 345 475 176 306 436
16 282 442 602 218 348 538 170 330 490 122 282 442
19 240 430 620 164 354 544 107 297 487 50 240 430
Note: First entry in each block: pro￿t per submarket in low demand state, second
entry:a v e r a g ep r o ￿t, third entry: pro￿ti nh i g hd e m a n ds t a t e .
Finally, the labels of strategies correspond roughly to the actual equilibrium
strategies used to calculate the payoﬀs. For demand uncertainty the strategy
labels are simple the equilibrium strategies of the subgames rounded to the
next integer. For cost uncertainty (where this procedure would have yielded
strategies 7, 8, 10, 11) we relabeled strategies, which, of course should be
irrelevant for subjects decisions.
2.2 Quantity competition
The inverse demand function in the Cournot treatments is given by
p =m a x {a − qi − qj,0}.
To model uncertainty, the random variable a can take the values of 50 and
30, each with probability 1/2. With a linear cost function, one could equiva-
lently have uncertainty about marginal cost c. Here, we normalize c to zero.
Operating pro￿ts for each project are given by
πi = pqi.
Again we choose four possible actions which correspond to the equilibrium
quantities in the four possible subgames. Rounding to the next integer and
adding a constant of 202 to all payoﬀsw eg e tt h ep a y o ﬀ matrix displayed in
Table 5.
3 Theoretical predictions
Theory predicts that the choice of debt levels should determine the outcomes
in the product market. We consider the subgame perfect equilibrium of our
8two￿stage game. Once debt levels are determined, the limited liability eﬀect
implies that the managers (acting in the interest of the equityholders) of the
￿rm maximize
E(max{πi − Di,0}).
In our case this implies in particular that ￿rms with large debt ignore states
of the world in which they go bankrupt. That is, they maximize expected
net pro￿t by choosing prices on the basis of the favorable entries in Tables 3
through 5. On the other hand, ￿rms with low debt can always meet the debt
obligations. Thus, they maximize expected pro￿t by considering expected
operating pro￿ts as shown in italics in Tables 3 through 5. For example,
if player 1 has high debt and player 2 low debt, then the unique equilib-
rium with cost uncertainty is found by considering the low cost numbers for
player 1 and by considering the average pro￿ts for player 2 in Table 3. The
equilibrium is (8,9) since 8 is a best reply against 9 when considering low
cost numbers and 9 is a best reply to 8 when considering average pro￿ts.8
Continuing in this fashion we obtain
Prediction S(ubgames) The equilibrium actions (price or quantity, re-
spectively) for the subgames de￿ned by the debt structures of two
￿rms in a given match are
debt levels
action type of uncertainty dd Dd dD DD
price cost (10,10) (8,9) (9,8) (7,7)
price demand (9,9) (11,10) (10,11)( 12,12)
quantity (13,13) (19,9) (9,19) (16,16)
All subgames can be solved by iterative elimination of strictly domi-
nated strategies. Thus, the equilibrium in each subgame is unique. Those
equilibrium predictions are relevant for the years 1 through 4. In year ￿ve,
however, the debt levels can be chosen by subjects. Using the parameters
d = b =1 , D =6 2 ,a n dB =5 0for demand uncertainty and B =4 3for cost
uncertainty, respectively, we can derive the symmetric, reduced form game
by substituting the equilibrium payoﬀs of the subgames.









Note that d is a dominant strategy with cost uncertainty, whereas D
is the dominant strategy for demand uncertainty. Thus, as in Showalter￿s
(1995) model, with cost uncertainty ￿rms would opt for as little debt as
possible, while with demand uncertainty they would choose large debt levels.
Prediction P (Showalter) With price competition and cost uncertainty
players will choose minimal debt (d,d). With demand uncertainty
players will choose maximal debt levels (D,D).
Finally, we can also explain how we chose the parameters b,d,B and D
from Table 2. Assuming perfect competition on the capital market, a zero
(expected) pro￿t condition for creditors must hold. When a ￿rm chooses d,
it can always repay its debt. Hence, there is no need for a risk premium,
and d = b =1 . With price competition and cost uncertainty ￿rms choose d
in equilibrium. However, if a ￿rm were to ask for a loan D, creditors would
anticipate that the competitor would choose d since d is a dominant strategy.
With cost uncertainty the constellation (Dd) results in equilibrium (8,9) for
which the expected return payment to the creditor is just 1
262 + 1
224 = 43.
With demand uncertainty ￿rms choose D in equilibrium. Hence, B results
from an expected return payment of 1
262 + 1
238 = 50.
The same procedure yields a reduced form game for quantity competition
that yields a Prisoner￿s dilemma structure with D as a dominant strategy





Prediction Q (Brander￿Lewis) With quantity competition players will
choose maximal debt levels (D,D).
10Table 6: number of d choices
matching groups
action type of uncertainty up #1 up #2 down #1 down #2
price cost 5 4 6 5
price demand 2 3 3 2
quantity 1 44 5
quantity 5 4 4 4
Again, the low debt obligation d =4 0is chosen such that repayment is
possible under all circumstances. When D is chosen under quantity com-
petition, the opponent will also choose D (since it is a dominant strategy),
and creditors can expect a repayment of B = 1
2400 + 1
2170 = 285.9
4R e s u l t s
Of primary interest is, of course, whether our data con￿rm Predictions S,
P and Q of the previous section. We will begin with Predictions P and Q
which state that subjects will opt for low debt levels when there is price
competition and cost uncertainty and for high debt levels when there is
demand uncertainty. When there is quantity competition, subjects should
choose high debt levels. Table 6 presents the number of subjects who chose
low debt levels d in year 5 for each of our matching groups (consisting of 6
subjects each).
For price competition and cost uncertainty most subjects follow the sub-
game perfect equilibrium prediction and choose low debt d. For demand
uncertainty the results are less clear cut but still the majority chooses large
debt as predicted. Considering each matching group as one independent ob-
servation, the diﬀerence between cost and demand uncertainty is signi￿cant
at the 1% level of a one￿sided MWU test.10 Thus, our data seems to con￿rm
Predictions P in that there is a clear diﬀerence between cost and demand
uncertainty in terms of the choice of the debt level as predicted by theory.
For quantity competition, however, the results strongly deviate from the
9We granted creditors an expected pro￿to f1 to have an even amount of D =4 0 0 .
10Here we pool the data from the up and down treatments since at least for this question
there seems to be no diﬀerence between those treatments.
11subgame perfect equilibrium prediction D. Only one of our 8 matching
groups comes close to con￿rming Prediction Q. Also, treating each group
as one observation, the incidence of d￿choices in the Q treatments is signif-
icantly higher than in the D treatments (two￿sided MWU test, 5% level).
Thus, one may be tempted to conclude that the limited liability eﬀect works
only for price competition. However, the following detailed analysis of be-
havior in the subgames will reveal that it is more complicated than that.
4.1 Price competition
When we analyze the behavior in the four possible subgames (de￿ned by
the debt levels of the two ￿rms), it seems at ￿rst that subjects are justi￿ed
in choosing the equilibrium debt levels, as the behavior in the subgames of
year 5 also largely conforms to the equilibrium predictions ￿ at least on the
equilibrium path. With cost uncertainty the equilibrium price 10 was chosen
in 94.7% of cases when both subjects in a match had low debt levels, (dd).
With demand uncertainty the equilibrium price 12 was chosen in 82.3% of
cases following (DD).Y e t oﬀ the equilibrium path behavior is much less
in line with the equilibrium predictions. In no oﬀ equilibrium subgame the
equilibrium price is chosen by more than half of subjects. This sheds some
doubt on the success of the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction which
will be substantiated by the following analysis of Prediction S for years 1
through 4.
Table 7 lists the relative frequency of equilibrium play for years 1 through
4 given that a particular price is the equilibrium price in a given subgame.
For example, in treatment N￿up the lowest price (7 with cost uncertainty, 9
with demand uncertainty) is played in only 10.40% of the cases in which it
is the equilibrium price.
Table 7 shows clearly that the equilibrium price is a good predictor
only when it is the highest price (10 with cost uncertainty, 12w i t hd e m a n d
uncertainty). In all other cases a large majority chooses non￿equilibrium
prices. In fact, the highest price is chosen in more than 50% of cases even
when it is not the equilibrium price (not shown in table). Furthermore, as
the average over all treatments shows there is a monotonic trend in that
subjects seem to be more reluctant to choose low equilibrium prices. Thus,
we can safely reject Prediction S for price competition. Subjects do not
12Table 7: frequency of equilibrium play in subgames in %
prices
treatment lowest 2nd lowest 2nd highest highest
C￿up 29.86 30.78 27.77 63.19
C￿down 7.64 15.95 29.83 99.31∗
N￿up 10.40 15.78 19.19 70.14∗
N￿down 4.86 19.44 24.28 46.53
average 13.9 20.49 25.27 69.79
∗ highest price is equilibrium action in year 4.
choose equilibrium prices in the subgames, rather they seem to collude by
choosing the highest prices.
Table 7 also shows that order eﬀects play a role. In treatments N￿up
and C￿down the highest price is the equilibrium price in the fourth year,
whereas in the remaining treatments the highest price is the equilibrium
price in the ￿rst year. In the ￿rst two treatments the percentages in which
the highest price is chosen in equilibrium are clearly higher indicating that
subjects may learn to cooperate with time.
Further evidence against Prediction S can be gained from considering
decisions in the ￿rst years of each treatments. Since one can consider each
matched pair of subjects as one independent observation, we have six ob-
servations for each treatment. Comparing the up and down treatments we
￿nd no signi￿cant diﬀerence between the (dd) and the (DD) treatments,
neither for average prices in year 1, nor for median prices, nor for prices in
t h et w e l f t hm o n t ho fy e a r1.T h i s￿nding holds for both, cost and demand
uncertainty.
However, even if Prediction S fails in the strict sense, we can formulate
weaker predictions about the eﬀect of debt on prices.
Prediction S1￿ With cost uncertainty, a ￿rm with high debt chooses lower
prices than a ￿rm with low debt. The reverse holds for demand un-
certainty.
Prediction S2￿ With cost uncertainty, high debt implies lower prices of














































































Figure 1: Average action in years 1-4 of ￿rm 1
14The ￿rst two panels of Figure 1 compare average prices with the the-
oretical predictions. Black bars show average prices of ￿rm 1, p(d1,d 2),
calculated for years 1 through 4 when ￿rm 1 has debt level d1 and ￿rm 2
has debt level d2, di ∈ {d,D}. Likewise, grey bars show the correspond-
ing prices predicted by theory. Comparing p(dd) with p(Dd) and p(dD)
with p(DD) reveals that for cost uncertainty an increase of ￿rm i￿s debt
decreases ￿rm i￿s average price. For demand uncertainty, an increase of ￿rm
i￿s debt increases ￿rm i￿s average price slightly. Comparing the behavior of
each subject in those situations, we ￿nd that Prediction S1￿i ss a t i s ￿ed in
72.9% of the cases for cost uncertainty and in 45.8% of the cases for demand
uncertainty.
We can also analyze the eﬀect of ￿rms￿ debt on the opponents￿ prices by
comparing p(dd) with p(dD) and p(Dd) with p(DD). Figure 1 shows that
for demand uncertainty debt has no discernible eﬀect on opponents￿ prices.
For cost uncertainty, average prices seem to be slightly lower when the op-
ponent￿s debt is high (though this diﬀerence is not signi￿cant). Analyzing
the price setting behavior for each subject in those situations reveals that
Prediction S2￿ is con￿rmed in 56.25% of the cases for cost uncertainty and
in 31.25% of the cases for demand uncertainty.
We see that the tendency stated in Prediction S1￿i sc o n ￿rmed. How-
ever, this eﬀect is much less pronounced than predicted by the equilibrium
in the subgames. In fact, treating averages from each matching group as
one independent observation,11 there are no signi￿cant diﬀerences between
average prices for demand uncertainty at all. For cost uncertainty, the only
signi￿cant diﬀerence is that p(dd) is larger than p(DD) at the 5% level of
a two￿sided MWU test. Thus, apart from the latter case, we cannot reject
t h eh y p o t h e s i st h a td e b tl e v e l sh a v en oe ﬀect on prices in the subgames.
Given this reluctance of subjects to follow the equilibrium predictions in
the subgames, how come that the equilibrium prediction of the entire game
works fairly well (see Prediction P)? To answer this question we calculate
the theoretical best replies on the ￿rst stage against the empirically observed
behavior in the second stage. Two alternatives can be considered. First, a
subject could optimize on the ￿rst stage under the assumption that behavior
11This yields 4 observations for p(dd) and p(DD) and 8 observations for p(dD) and
p(Dd).


































(including his own) corresponds to the empirically observed behavior on the
second stage in a particular treatment (naive beliefs). Second, a subject
could optimize under the presumption that only the play of his potential
opponents is determined by the empirically observed distribution and the
subjects chooses a best reply against this on both stages (sophisticated be-
liefs).12
As Tables 8 and 9 show, Prediction P holds for all treatments except D￿
down regardless of whether we assume naive or sophisticated beliefs. Thus,
12The empirical distribution is calculated without excluding the subject in question.
Otherwise, there would be distinct beliefs for each subject.
16Table 10: frequency of equilibrium play in subgames in %
quantities
treatment lowest 2nd lowest 2nd highest highest
Q￿up 18.08 42.70 33.35 38.90
Q￿down 28.82 30.90 34.00 44.45
average 23.45 36.80 33.68 41.75
in most cases and in particular for cost uncertainty, subjects￿ choices of debt
levels in year 5 are justi￿ed by the empirical behavior in the subgames of
years 1 through 4.
To sum up, for price competition we ￿nd the following. (1) There is a
general tendency towards higher, i.e. more collusive, prices (which explains
the predictive power on the equilibrium path). (2) Debt levels have only
minor eﬀects on the chosen prices with the exception of cost uncertainty
where (dd) yields signi￿cantly higher prices than (DD) (which explains the
dismal prediction oﬀ equilibrium path). (3) Consistent with the empirical
behavior in the subgames, subjects opt signi￿cantly more often for minimal
debt with cost uncertainty than with demand uncertainty. Thus, while
Prediction P (Showalter) is con￿rmed, it is con￿rmed for the wrong reason
and not because the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction works well.
4.2 Quantity competition
The analysis of the behavior in the four possible subgames (de￿ned by the
debt levels of the two ￿rms) shows that ￿rms do not play according to the
equilibrium solution in any subgame. Table 10l i s t st h er e l a t i v ef r e q u e n c y
of equilibrium play for years 1 through 4 given that a particular quantity
is the equilibrium quantity in a given subgame. For example, in treatment
Q￿up the quantity 9 is played in only 18.08% of the cases in which it is the
equilibrium quantity. Table 10 shows clearly that in each case the majority
chooses non￿equilibrium quantities. Thus, prediction S can be rejected for
quantity competition.
We can again test a weaker version of Prediction S as follows.
Prediction S1* More debt for ￿rm i implies a higher quantity for ￿rm i.
17Prediction S2* More debt for ￿rm i implies a lower quantity for ￿rm j.
The lowest panel in Figure 1 shows ￿rm i￿s average quantities in year
1 through 4, qi(di,d j),w h e n￿rm i has debt level di and ￿rm j has ￿rm
level dj. The comparison of q(dD) with q(DD) and q(dd) with q(Dd) shows
that Prediction S1* is supported by the data. An increase in the own debt
level yields an increase in own quantity. Counting the decisions of individual
￿rms, we ￿nd that in 87.5% of cases a ￿rm￿s quantity increases with its debt
level. More formally, a MWU test rejects equality between q(ddi) and q(Ddi)
for di = d and D at a 1% level of signi￿cance in favor of q(Ddi) >q (ddi).
The comparison of q(dD) with q(dd) and q(DD) with q(Dd) does not
support Prediction S2*. An increase in the opponent￿s debt level does not
yields a signi￿cant decrease in own quantity. Comparing a ￿rm￿s behavior
in two situations which diﬀer only in the opponent￿s debt level, we ￿nd that
Prediction S2* is con￿rmed in only 54.2% of the cases, which is not much
diﬀerent from randomness. Based on a MWU test, equality between q(did)
and q(diD) cannot be rejected for di = d or D at any conventional level of
signi￿cance.
The limited liability eﬀect seems to have a signi￿cant eﬀect when it
is based on the own debt level. But subjects seem to ignore it when it
is due to the indebtedness of the opponent. In other words, on the one
hand subjects seem to recognize the strategic advantage of debt and try to
exploit it. On the other hand, they do not want to grant their opponents
an advantage and simply ignore the eﬀects of their opponents￿ debt levels.
This behavior, which is somewhat reminiscent of responder behavior in the
ultimatum game (see e.g. Roth, 1995), has overall a bene￿cial eﬀect since it
avoids the Prisoner￿s Dilemma structure in the strategic debt game. Hence,
it is not surprising that so few subjects choose D (see Table 6). When
we construct the reduced form games for empirically observed behavior in
the subgames we ￿nd that, in fact, minimal debt,d ,becomes a dominant









18The fact that subjects seem to ignore the debt levels of their opponents
also explains why few subjects play according to the equilibrium prediction
i nt h es u b g a m e sa ss h o w nb yT a b l e10.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In a seminal paper Brander and Lewis (1986) suggested how leverage can
promote the competitiveness of a ￿rm by making it more aggressive. The
empirical tests of this hypothesis (and of its extension to price competition
by Showalter, 1995) has, however, produced mixed results at best. By and
large, the empirical literature supports the view that debt leads to softer
competition. That is, higher debt levels yield lower quantities and higher
prices.13 However, the empirical data usually do not allow to disentangle
where exactly the model￿s prediction breaks down. For this, one would need
to know details on the type of competition (price versus quantity) and on
the type of uncertainty in the market. Also, one would need to control for
all other factors that may in￿uence a ￿rm￿s choice of debt.
Thus, in this paper we report on the ￿rst experimental test to study the
speci￿c linkage between ￿nancial and product market decisions, the limited
liability eﬀect of debt ￿nancing. Our main results are that with quantity
competition, debt has a strategic eﬀect only on the own output and is ignored
by the opponents. In turn, this implies that subjects choose much less
debt than predicted by Brander and Lewis (1986). With price competition,
subjects in the majority choose high debt with demand uncertainty and
low debt with cost uncertainty as predicted by Showalter (1995). However,
since behavior in oﬀ￿equilibrium subgames is not in line with theory, we
explain this ￿nding by a general tendency towards collusion rather than by
subgame perfect play. Overall, we ￿nd that subjects behave conditionally
rational as their choice of debt levels is compatible with the empirically
observed behavior in the subgames.
13This empirical evidence is consistent with a number of alternative theoretical explana-
tions e.g. Brander and Lewis (1988) for low debt levels; Glazer (1994); Showalter (1995)
f o rc o s tu n c e r t a i n t y ;N i e r( 1999); Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996), and Faure￿Grimaud
(2000).
19A Translation of instructions14
W e l c o m et oo u re x p e r i m e n t ! P l e a s et a k ey o u rt i m et or e a dt h ee n t i r ei n -
structions carefully! During the next one and a half hours you can make
some money by making various decisions at a computer (the monetary units
a r em e a s u r e di n￿ T a l e r ￿a n da tt h ee n do ft h ee x p e r i m e n tt h e yw i l lb e
transformed in DM at the exchange rate of 2000:1). Please do not speak
with other participants during the experiment. If you have any questions
regarding the procedure, please refer quietly to the experimenter.
1. Timing
For a period of 5 years you are the manager of an internationally op-
erating company, which sells a good X in 10d i ﬀerent countries. There is
another company, which oﬀers the same product. In each year a diﬀerent
participant of this experiment will be the manager of the other company.
As manager you have to make the following decisions: A year is divided
in 12 months. At the beginning of each month you choose the price of good
X, which is the same in each country. The company owners have set the
degree of indebtedness for the ￿rst 4 years. At the beginning of the last year
you decide additionally on the extent of indebtedness of the company you
manage.
2. Pro￿ts
At the beginning of each month the production of good X in every coun-
try needs to be ￿nanced through debt. Debt can be either high or low and
this is ￿x e df o rt h ee n t i r ey e a r .A c c o r d i n g l y ,t h e r ei sah i g ho rl o wr e p a y m e n t
obligation.
The success of your product in a country depends partly on chance. The
computer decides at random and independently for each country whether
business conditions are ￿favorable￿ or ￿unfavorable￿. The probabilities for
both conditions are 1
2.
The gross pro￿t( p r o ￿tb e f o r ed e b tr e p a y m e n t )o u to ft h es a l e si na
country depends on the price you choose, the price of the other company,
and the random business condition. Gross pro￿t can be seen in the following
table:
14These are the instructions for treatments C￿up and C￿down.
20your the other￿s price
price 7 8 9 10
7 1011 6 111 12 123 7 132 3
8 99 29 1102 7 125 24 135 22
9 90 41 103 41 121 41 134 42
10 79 45 94 47 1144 9 128 51
In every cell of the table you ￿nd the gross pro￿t in the unfavorable
condition (in italics) and in the favorable condition. The corresponding gross
pro￿ts of the other company are determined through an identical table. For
example, if your price is 9 and the price of the other company is 10, your
gross pro￿t will be 42 in the unfavorable condition or 134 in the favorable
condition. The gross pro￿t of the other company is 49 or 114, respectively,
which can be seen from the table above when you place yourself in the other￿s
shoes.
Out of the gross pro￿t from each country you have to repay your debt
obligation, inasmuch as this is possible. If your debt is higher than your
gross pro￿t, you will have to pay your entire gross pro￿t. In every case you
keep the ￿nancing, which you received at the beginning.
F o re x a m p l e ,i fy o u rg r o s sp r o ￿t for a certain country is 134 Taler, your
repayment obligation is 62 Taler, and the ￿nancing you received is 43 Taler,
then your net pro￿tf o rt h i sc o u n t r yw i l lb e115( =1 3 4−62+43)T a l e r .B u t
if your gross pro￿t were only 42 Taler, then you would be able to pay back
only those 42 Taler. The net pro￿t would be 43 (=4 2−42+43)b e c a u s ey o u
have to repay the entire gross pro￿t but you can keep the debt ￿nancing.
At the top right of the computer screen you see your current repayment
obligation as well as the repayment obligation of the other company.
At the end of a month you can see the success in the 10 countries and
the price set by the other company for that month. In the next month you
can set a new price. At the end of 12 months a new year will start and you
are confronted with a new management in the other company.
3. Choosing the amount of the debt
In years 1-4 you cannot choose the amount of debt (and the resulting
repayment obligation). The computer will tell you at the beginning of every
year the amount of debt and the repayment obligation, which will be valid
for the whole year. When debt is high, you will receive ￿nancing of 43 Taler
21a n da tt h ee n do ft h em o n t hy o uh a v et or e p a y6 2T a l e r( a sf a ra sp o s s i b l e ) .
When debt is low, you will receive 1 Taler ￿nancing and you will have to
repay 1 Taler.
I nt h e5 t hy e a ry o uc a nc h o o s eb e t w e e nh i g ho rl o wd e b t￿nancing.
4. Total pro￿t
Your total pro￿t in Taler is the sum of all the net pro￿ts from every
m o n t ho ft h e5y e a r s .
Thank you for your participation
Please answer the following two questions ￿rst.
Questions
1. Assume that your debt ￿nancing is high and you chose a price of 7.
If the other company chooses the price 9 and the business conditions are
unfavorable, what would your net pro￿tb e ?
2. What would be your net pro￿t in the above situation when business
conditions were favorable?
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